Florida Law Review
Volume 9

Issue 3

Article 5

September 1956

Lost Profits as Element of Damages in Willful Unfair Competition
Cases
James O. Driscoll

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James O. Driscoll, Lost Profits as Element of Damages in Willful Unfair Competition Cases, 9 Fla. L. Rev.
336 (1956).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol9/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Driscoll: Lost Profits as Element of Damages in Willful Unfair Competition

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Sep 8 16:04:13 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
James O. Driscoll, Lost Profits as Element of Damages in Willful Unfair Competition
Cases, 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 336 (1956).
ALWD 7th ed.
James O. Driscoll, Lost Profits as Element of Damages in Willful Unfair Competition
Cases, 9 U. Fla. L. Rev. 336 (1956).
APA 7th ed.
Driscoll, J. O. (1956). Lost profits as element of damages in willful unfair
competition cases. University of Florida Law Review, 9(3), 336-347.
Chicago 17th ed.
James O. Driscoll, "Lost Profits as Element of Damages in Willful Unfair Competition
Cases," University of Florida Law Review 9, no. 3 (Fall 1956): 336-347
McGill Guide 9th ed.
James O. Driscoll, "Lost Profits as Element of Damages in Willful Unfair Competition
Cases" (1956) 9:3 U Fla L Rev 336.
AGLC 4th ed.
James O. Driscoll, 'Lost Profits as Element of Damages in Willful Unfair Competition
Cases' (1956) 9(3) University of Florida Law Review 336
MLA 9th ed.
Driscoll, James O. "Lost Profits as Element of Damages in Willful Unfair Competition
Cases." University of Florida Law Review, vol. 9, no. 3, Fall 1956, pp. 336-347.
HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
James O. Driscoll, 'Lost Profits as Element of Damages in Willful Unfair Competition
Cases' (1956) 9 U Fla L Rev 336
Provided by:
University of Florida / Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1956], Art. 5
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LOST PROFITS AS ELEMENT OF DAMAGES IN
WILLFUL UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES
The essential characteristic of the tort of unfair competition is misrepresentation to the public of one man's goods or services as being
those of another. The methods and devices used to effect the misrepresentation are many and varied; the most common examples are
the use of another's trade-mark, trade name, or distinctive package
dress. For unfair competition, as for other torts, the plaintiff is entitled to general damages for all foreseeable injuries proximately
caused him by the defendant's wrongdoing;' he is also entitled to those
special damages that he is able to plead and prove. The subject of
special damages is not discussed in this note.
An important element of any plaintiff's case for general damages
is that of profits that would have materialized had the defendant not
passed off his goods to an unsuspecting public. A plaintiff may seek
his remedy at law or in equity; by praying for injunctive relief against
the future commission of similar torts he invokes the jurisdiction
of the equity court and enables it to award him monetary compensation for injuries already sustained. It is here that he encounters a
variation from the usual concepts of damages.
In equity the plaintiff may be entitled to choose between two
mutually exclusive alternatives in obtaining that element of compensation that is called "lost profits": (1) he may proceed as he would
in a court of law and seek an award that represents the profits he
would have made had it not been for the defendant's activities - they
will be awarded to the extent that they can be ascertained by reference
to the plaintiff's books; or (2) he may utilize the concept that is a
unique creature of equity and recover the profits that the defendant
actually made as a result of his activities - these will be determined,
of course, by reference to the defendant's books. The first alternative
will be referred to in this note by the term "plaintiff's profits" and
2
the second alternative by the term "defendant's profits."
The subject of damages in the unfair competition setting has been
accorded consideration by the authorities separate from that given
the generic term.' This is wholly consistent with their regard of un'Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. United Drug Co., 149 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 761 (1945);

RESTATEMENT,

22 NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION

TORTS §746 (1938).

AND TRADE-MARXS

§419 (4th ed. 1947).

3E.g., 4 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §89 (2d ed. 1950); 2
NIMs, op. cit. supra note 2, §§419-32.
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fair competition as a peculiar species of tort. It is a body of law unto
itself, and nothing is gained by comparing its characteristics with those
of its less evasive cousins. The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of compensation situations in which the defendant's actions
are willful, that is, in which he is conscious of his invasion upon the
plaintiff's rights. This has been done in order to avoid the uncertainty with which these concepts are applied in nonwillful situations
and to provide a base for discussion of the rule applied in three recent
cases4 of this nature before the Florida Supreme Court.
PLAINTIFF'S PROFITS

The concept of plaintiff's profits in an equity court is nothing
more or less than its counterpart in a law court. Here as in a law
court the plaintiff's case for damages is essentially his own, and he
is subject to the same restrictions that he would encounter in a court
of law. Compensation, however, is probably of secondary concern
only; he is primarily interested in injunctive relief, which is why he
came to equity. 5
The Rule of Certainty
A plaintiff who seeks to recover his lost profits in a tort or contract
action must prove the fact of and the monetary value of his profitinjury to a reasonable degree of certainty.6 Ordinarily the best evidence available to him to prove this element is his own record of past
profits. 7 It is readily seen, however, that in many situations this evidence may fall short of showing what part of his profit-injury is attributable to the defendant's conduct and what part is the result of
extraneous factors. When fact situations arise in which this impasse
is reached, courts split into two camps in providing a solution. Some
steadfastly demand more precise proof of the plaintiff, and some delegate the job of apportionment to the trier of fact, the chancellor himself in an equity case, without requiring further evidence from the
4Rimmeir v. Dickson, 78 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1955); Sentco Inc. v. McCulloh, 68
So.2d 577 (Fla. 1953); Florida Vent. Awning Co. v. Dickson, 67 So.2d 215 (Fla.

1953).
5But see Lampert v. Judge and Dolph Drug Co., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S.W. 1095

(1911).
0McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § §25, 26, 28 (1935). But see Liberty Oil Corp. v. Crowley,
Milner & Co., 270 Mich. 187, 258 N.W. 241 (1935).
7McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES §29 (1935).
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plaintiff.8 If the latter alternative is taken the defendant is permitted
to dear up the uncertainty if he can. 9
Strict application of the rule of certainty is quite capable of
bringing harsh consequences to the plaintiff. Although there are
varying degrees of certainty, there is only one reasonable degree; and
if the plaintiff fails to satisfy the court that he has reached that degree
of proof he gets nothing for his efforts. To alleviate this, courts have
created certain doctrines that modify the general rule. Among those
that are particularly applicable to cases of unfair competition are the
following: (1) if the defendant's wrong has caused the difficulty of
proof of damage, he cannot complain of the resulting uncertainty; 0
(2) given the fact of damage, mere difficulty in ascertaining the amount
1
of damage is not fatal to the plaintiff's case for some compensation;
and (3)mathematical precision in fixing the amount of damage is
2
not required.1
Unfair Competition Cases. In unfair competition cases there is
no presumption that the plaintiff would have made the sales effected
by the defendant during the period of the commission of the tort;13
the plaintiff must prove the extent to which he has been damaged.
The Restatement of Torts extends the rule a step further by stating
that "a showing merely of a decrease in plaintiff's total sales does not
establish a causal connection between the decrease and the defendant's
conduct."' 4 The Restatement offers the suggestion that the deficiency
in causal connection may be cured by the plaintiff's showing his drop
in sales and then negating the effects of other possible causes.' 5
These doctrines may be reconciled with the statement of the rule
81bid.

9Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949),
afJ'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951); W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co.,
103 Me. 334, 69 Atl. 569 (1907); McCoPm.scK, DAMAGES §29 (1935).
'oMcCoRMicK, DAMAGES §27 (1935).
"'Ibid.

'121bid.; see also W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 103 Me. 334, 69
Ati. 569, 571 (1905), for an application of these modifying doctrines in the unfair
competition context.
31.ESATEMENT, TORTS §746, comment c (1938). This rule applies only to the
extent of damage and not to the fact of damage. Infringement of a trade-mark
usually raises a presumption of the fact of injury. See El Modello Cigar Mfg. Co.
v. Gato, 25 Fla. 886, 7 So. 23 (1890).
14RsrATEMENT, TORTS §746, comment c (1938).

'5lbid.
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of certainty and its refinements. The most accessible if not the best
evidence that the plaintiff can produce is his record of past profits.
Ordinarily a reduction of profits indicates a reduction in the number
of sales. Factors that belie this equation, such as mounting production and distribution costs, may be ascertained by reference to the
plaintiff's records and taken into account without much trouble.
Hence the Restatement simply recognizes that there may have been
operative factors in the decrease of plaintiff's sales, such as falling
prices or the entrance of a new competitor into the market, that were
unrelated to the defendant's wrongful act.
The Florida Ventilated Case
In 1953 the Supreme Court of Florida by its decision in Florida
Ventilated Awning Co. v. Dickson16 contributed to the confusion surrounding the awarding of plaintiff's profits as an element of damages.
The trial court established the amount of the defendant's gross receipts during the period of infringement of the plaintiff's trade name
and found that if the plaintiff had sold all of the awnings marketed
by the defendant during the relevant period his net profits would
have been increased by $15,000. In the face of the further finding that
the plaintiff would have made most of the defendant's sales, the
plaintiff was denied recompense for his lost profits by the lower
court. The Supreme Court affirmed because in its opinion there
was no reasonably definite basis on which to determine what part
of the defendant's sales would have been the plaintiff's in absence
of the infringement.
The Court's opinion does not disclose the kind and amount of evidence produced by the plaintiff, so an evaluation of the decision on
the merits seems impossible. Considering the findings of fact by the
trial court, however, these conclusions may follow: (1) the rule of
certainty was applied categorically and strictly, without temperance
by any one of the three vague but commendable modifying doctrines
mentioned above; and (2) the Court was unwilling to join those
courts that accept the plaintiff's loss of profits as a starting point and
reduce them for purposes of an award to the extent that the defendant
proves that they were caused by factors unrelated to his infringement.
1067 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1953). The facts of this case that are discussed in the
text are not set forth in the opinion; they appear, however, in the opinion in
Rimmeir v. Dickson, 78 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1955); see also Sentco, Inc. v. McCulloh, 68

So.2d 577 (Fla. 1953).
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The second conclusion is perhaps not warranted. There is in the
opinion no indication of how the lower court reached its finding that
the plaintiff would have made additional profits amounting to $15,000
in the absence of the defendant's activities. If this figure was reached
by inference from the number and amount of sales made by the defendant - and this appears to be the case - the plaintiff proved the
wrong thing, and the finding of lost profits was unjustified as a matter
of law. The starting point in computing the plaintiff's lost profits
is the amount by which his profits dropped during the period of infringement, not the amount of profits made by the defendant.
It is somewhat obvious that the starting point of the plaintiff's
drop in profits is to a considerable extent a fictitious figure. Considering the economic context in which this tort occurred, it is entirely conceivable that the plaintiff actually enjoyed a rise in profits during
the period of infringement over those of the immediately preceding
comparable period. If the starting point is taken only from the plaintiff's books, it does not reflect the general economic trend, which has
much to do with his success or failure. It seems axiomatic that during
a general economic advance the starting point indicated by the plaintiff's books will be lower than the figure that would be absolutely accurate, which could be ascertained by considering his customary rate
of surpassing past profits and the rate at which sales of similar goods
increased in the relevant geographical market during the period of
infringement. The converse would, of course, be true in a general
economic recession.
Although these problems may be solved to a satisfactory extent
by expert testimony, the question remains, who must produce the
experts? In a rising market the plaintiff would be eager to produce
this evidence to show the court that his profits, although healthy
during the relevant period, would have been even greater in the
absence of the defendant's tortious conduct. The defendant would
be more inclined to produce the evidence if the plaintiff's sales
probably would have decreased along with those of everyone else
in the market. These problems are mentioned in passing because the
ease with which they are settled may depend on the court's willingness
to apportion the plaintiff's loss or failure to gain between the defendant's activities and unrelated factors.
DEFENDANT'S PROFITS

It was pointed out in the introduction to this note that a plain-
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tiff injured by willful unfair competition may, by invoking the jurisdiction of a court of equity, seek the defendant's profits as compensation for his loss of sales. This alternative is called "equitable damages" by some courts.17 By choosing this method of compensation the
plaintiff is precluded from seeking plaintiff's profits, which are actually
and logically called "damages" in the common law sense of the term.
Equity courts disallow recovery of both defendant's profits and
plaintiff's profits because they are in effect alternative methods of
compensation for the same element of injury.'$
In seeking defendant's profits the plaintiff prays for an injunction
and an accounting of profits. He does not invoke the jurisdiction of
equity by requesting an accounting only. 19 The term "accounting of
profits" means one of two things when used by a court. It may
describe the order by which the defendant must open his records and
set forth his sales and resulting profits during the period of unfair
competition,20 or it may describe the purpose of the order by which
the defendant must turn over his profits to the plaintiff.2 In the
latter sense "accounting of profits" means disgorging of profits.
The general theory propounded by the courts as a basis for an
accounting of profits is that profits realized by a defendant through unfair competition actually belong to the plaintiff. A legal fiction is
resorted to whereby the defendant holds these in a trust ex maleficio for
the plaintiff's benefit. -" As trustee of this constructive trust the
defendant must account for these profits to the plaintiff.
The HistoricalBasis: Trade-Mark Infringement
Persons injured by an infringement of their trade-marks were
the first victims of unfair competition to be deemed entitled to defendant's profits. The reason for this innovation was that the defend'7See Avery v. Meikle, 85 Ky. 435, 3 S.V. 609 (1887).
'SMichel Cosmetics, Inc. v. Tsirkas, 282 N.Y. 195, 26 N.E.2d 16 (1940); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§746, 747 (1938). But see W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe
Co., 103 Me. 334, 69 Ad. 569 (1907).
loLampert v. Judge and Dolph Drug Co., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S.W. 1095 (1911);
4 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §89.1 (a) (2d ed. 1950); 2
NiMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §424 (4th ed. 1947).
-0See Matzger v. Vinikow, 17 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1927).
"1See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
2E.g., Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916); see
Avery v. Miekle & Co., 85 Ky. 435, 3 S.W. 609 (1887). But see 58 HARV. L. REV.

615 (1945).
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ant by appropriating the trade-mark appropriated income-producing
property of the plaintiff. The trade-mark itself was the property.
The courts were not so quick to afford this remedy to victims of other
forms of unfair competition; it was difficult for the courts to see just
what property was appropriated by the use of the plaintiff's trade name
or his distinctive package dress. An injunction could issue to stop
misrepresentation to the public, and common law damages could be
awarded to the plaintiff, but without the conversion of certain property no award of defendant's profits could be made.
In 1896 the Supreme Court of the United States decided a case
of pure misrepresentation, that is, one involving nothing more than
23
a passing off of the defendant's goods as being those of the plaintiff.

In this case the plaintiff was awarded defendant's profits, and it formed
24
the basis for the application of this remedy in more recent cases.

Infringement of a trade-mark has been deliberately classified in
this note as a form of unfair competition. The essence of injury in
a trade-mark infringement case is the public's motivation to purchase
the defendant's product because it bears the plaintiff's trade-mark; the
theory is no different in cases involving the use of another's trade
name or package design. The wrong to be redressed is the fraud practiced by the defendant in passing his goods off to the public as being
those of the plaintiff, however accomplished. The property right
converted is the plaintiff's goodwill and not the plaintiff's symbol of
goodwill.2 5

Measurement of Defendant's Profits
There probably is no case of unfair competition of which it may
be said that every sale of a product by the defendant during the relevant period was the result of his tortious conduct in selling the product.
There are in each case many legitimate factors successfully used by
the defendant in the sale of the product. An award of all the defendant's net profits may result in a windfall to the injured plaintiff. Be
this as it may, little sympathy should be wasted upon a party who has
deliberately set out to capture a buying market by capitalizing on the
plaintiff's goodwill. The courts in recognizing the basic problem have
23Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
24Singer Mfg. Co. v. Redlich, 109 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Winifred Warren,
Inc. v. Turner's Gowns, Ltd., 285 N.Y. 62, 32 N.E.2d 793 (1941). But see G. &
C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, infra note 25.
25G. and C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 190 Fed. 927 (6th Cir. 1911).
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formulated what might be termed the defendant's burden of proof
rule:26 the defendant must account for all the profits realized through

his unfair competition, and the burden is upon hi&f to show and evaluate the factors that legitimately contributed to his sales, so that they
might be deducted from his net profits in ascertaining the amount of
the award. This rule seemingly is based on one of two historical
precedents.
One of the possible bases is found in patent law, which is a product
of legislation and not of the common law. The legislation that afforded the patent device and the attendant protection of ideas also
gave to a person whose patent was infringed the right to an award of
the profits realized by the defendant from the use of the patented
feature. This right to defendant's profits was borrowed from trademark case law, first by the courts and later by congressional enactment. In many cases the defendant's infringement consisted of the
use of the plaintiff's patented property as a small feature or innovation of the product he marketed. What part the use of this feature
played in bringing in the sales and resulting profits to the defendant
was, of course, highly speculative. The rule as finally established by
the courts in patent cases was that, if a plaintiff proves the fact of
infringement and by the nature of the infringement it is difficult to
apportion the profits, the defendant has the burden of making this
27

separation.

The second basis for the burden of proof rule in unfair competition cases originated in common law trade-mark infringement cases.
In the trade-mark cases the defendant's argument is that some of the
individual sales effected by him, and perhaps a part of each sale, resulted not from unfair competition but from the intrinsic merit of his
product. When this contention is made the defendant is often compared with a converter of property who has commingled his goods
with those of another and who is therefore required to separate his
28
victim's property from his own.
The apparently contrary rule is that the plaintiff has the burden
of proving that the defendant's profits resulted in whole or in part
from his trade-mark infringement or other unfair competition. 29 This
26See Mishawaka Rubber &.Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203
(1942); Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. 8- Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916).
27Westinghouse Elec. and Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. and Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604
(1911).
2sGraham v. Plate, 40 Cal. 593, 6 Am. Rep. 639 (1871).
20NMatzger v. Vinikow, 17 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1927); Ammon and Person v. Nar-
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is the position of the Restatement of Torts; 30 the Restatement, however,
recognizes an exception to the effect that the defendant's sales can be
"inferred"' 1 to have resulted from his unfair competition if his product bore the plaintiff's trade-mark or trade name. The Restatement
then goes one step further by stating that, if the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in producing his sales, he is liable
for the resulting profits and will not be allowed to deduct from these
profits the values of other factors that contributed to his sales, such
3
as the intrinsic merit of his product 2
It is not absolutely clear that the defendant's burden of proof rule
is irreconcilable with the views of the Restatement and of some courts
that place the initial burden on the plaintiff. The defendant's burden of proof rule has been applied for the most part in the very
exception approved by the Restatement- cases in which the defendant affixed the trade-mark or trade name to the product sold. Under
these circumstances the defendant is inferred even by the Restatement
to have made all his profits because of the unfair competition. The
Restatement view may be criticized because it is based on the notion
that the tort is the simple impression of the symbol of the plaintiff's
goodwill on the defendant's product rather than the use of the goodwill itself in misrepresentation to the public. Although there may
be some merit to the argument that a symbol placed on the product
is more likely to mislead than a symbol that is published separately
but in connection with the product's presentation to the public, this
argument seems to bear only on the type of evidence that best proves
the fact of misrepresentation. Moreover, the Restatement rationale
fails to explain the existence of cases in which no symbol was involved but the defendant's sales were nevertheless presumed to have
resulted from the defendant's misrepresentation. 33
The only other quarrel that might be made with the Restatement
rule is that it forbids the defendant to show what part the intrinsic
merits of his product played in producing his sales. If as a matter of
law the defendant cannot show this, the rule of the Restatement goes
ragansett Dairy Co., 252 Fed. 276, 254 Fed. 208 (D.R.I. 1918), afl'd, 262 Fed. 880
(Ist Cir. 1919).
S0RmATEMENT, ToRTs §747, comment c (1938).
3'Tbid.
32Ibid.
33E.g., William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. J. P. Larson, Jr., Co., 5 F.2d 731 (N.D. Ill.
1925), modified, 20 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 277 U.S. 97
(1928); see G. 9- C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 190 Fed. 927 (6th Cir. 1911); Winifred
Warren, Inc. v. Turner's Gowns, Ltd., 285 N.Y. 62, 32 N.EX.2d 793 (1941).
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further than the defendant's burden of proof rule. It is arguable
that this unduly penalizes the defendant. It must be recognized,
however, that rebuttal in these circumstances is close to a practical
impossibility. It could be accomplished only by the testimony of
buyers who recognized and wanted the defendant's product.
Florida:Rimrneir v. Dickson
The Florida Supreme Court has allowed awards of defendant's
profits to plaintiffs injured by trade-mark infringements. However, in Rimmeir v. Dickson,34 a 1955 trade name case, the Court indirectly refused to allow the plaintiff any portion of the profits made
by the defendant during the period of unfair competition. The
lower court determined that the defendant had realized a net profit
of $120,000 during the period of his wrongful acts. It applied the defendant's burden rule and ordered the infringer to come forth with
evidence to prove what portion of these profits was not attributable
to his unfair competition. The Supreme Court reversed, stating: 35
"It is true, as contended by plaintiffs, that in a suit under
the federal Trade-Mark Act . . . for infringement of a trade-

mark, the plaintiff is required to prove defendant's sales only,
and the burden is on the defendant to prove all elements of
cost or deduction claimed ....

But this shifting of the burden

of proof appears to be based on the express provisions of the
federal Act ....

While it may be that, upon a proper showing,

a case may be maintained for infringement of an unregistered
trade-mark, we have the view that no such showing has been
made in this case. Therefore, we are here concerned only with
infringement upon plaintiffs' trade name ....

[Tihe difficulty

in assessing damages in such cases is immediately apparent."
The Court's language does not preclude application of the defendant's burden rule in future common law trade-mark infringment cases. This will be done if the early Florida trade-mark cases
are followed; 36 uncertainty in prediction results from the Court's
statement that the defendant's burden rule is an express provision
3478 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1955).
33d. at 734.
3
QSee Arquelles v. Sabio, 66 Fla. 231, 63 So. 428 (1913); El Modello Cigar Mfg.
Co. v. Gato, 25 Fla. 886, 7 So. 23 (1890).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1956], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
is in error on this point.
the Court deals squarely
but states only that if the
and marketing costs, the
plaintiff will be entitled to the defendant's gross profits. 37 This, of
course, is a matter entirely different from that discussed in this section.
of the federal trade-mark act. The Court
The particular provision referred to by
enough with awards of defendant's profits,
defendant fails to prove his production

CONCLUSION

The rule denying a plaintiff the right to defendant's profits is
possibly not as unjustifiable as it appears at first glance. This remedy
can be had as a practical matter only after a long and costly process
that may in the final analysis amount to a denial of justice; this criticism is enough to convince Mr. Nims3s that the plaintiff should
be protected in another way. He suggests that the plaintiff's remedy
should be confined for the most part to damages, including plaintiff's
profits, and that courts should be less hesitant to award punitive
damages, particularly in cases in which the plaintiff's evidence justifies
an award of only nominal damages and the defendant's conduct was
of such a nature as to warrant monetary punishment.
The strictness with which the rule of certainty is applied by the
Florida Court to cases in which damages, that is, the plaintiff's
profits, are sought denies an injured plaintiff much chance to recover
adequate compensation. This rule should be construed to require a
plaintiff to prove the extent of his profit-injury to a degree of reasonable certainty and no further. The historical basis for the rule of
certainty stems from a distrust by the courts of the competency of a
jury to freely set an award of compensation in either tort or contract
cases. 39 If for no other reason than the fact that these cases usually
occur in a court of equity, where the chancellor sets the award, the
historical basis for the rule is not good authority for the stringency
with which it is applied. If a would-be converter of goodwill can
enter the market place, fraudulently cash in on another's name or
other symbol of goodwill, and escape with nothing more than a
knuckle rapping and an injunction against his repeating his activities,
what is to deter him from doing it at least once against each of his
competitors?
37Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 206, n.1
(1942); cf. RETATEMENT, TORTS §748, comment a (1938).
382 NIMs, UNFAIR COMPETMON AND TRADE-MARKS §432 (4th ed. 1947).
39McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES §26 (1935).
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Authority for the imposition of punitive damages on these trade
thiefs does exist. As a deterrent to future ventures it probably is more
effective than the award of the defendant's profits. It should be more
liberally used.
If a more equitable rule for awarding the plaintiff's profits among
other damages in these cases cannot be established, there is ample
authority for future awards of the defendant's profits.
If the confusion of Rimmeir v. Dickson is resolved in order to
give a plaintiff the right to a defendant's profits in appropriate cases,
the intricacies of each individual case should determine who has the
burden of coming forth with evidence to segregate the defendant's
tainted profits from those that he justly earned. The kind and degree
of misrepresentation should form the basis for this allocation of the
burden of proof. If the defendant has attached the plaintiff's name
to his products and places them on sale, or if he has capitalized on the
plaintiff's intensive advertising campaign by entering a pregnant
market with a product wrapped similarly to that of the plaintiff, it
should not be difficult to assume that the purchasers thought that
they were getting the plaintiff's product. In this case the burden of
segregation should be placed upon the defendant; the burden is one
that is practically impossible to discharge, and in order to reach a
just decision the court should consciously determine who is to bear it.
JAMES 0.

DRISCOLL
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